BRIDGE BREAK vulnerabilities in IP serial converters that check critical infrastructure

The devices that "move" traditional serial equipment with IP networks - the serious converters - to- IP - are often invisible until something fails. They are simple and effective parts that allow for the management of sensors, controllers and industrial equipment from remote locations, but a recent study by Forecout Vedere Labs has brought to light that this bridge can become a way of attack. Researchers have identified 22 vulnerabilities in widely deployed models of Lantronix and Silex, a set they have baptized as BRIDGE: BREAK and that risks the integrity and availability of communications in critical infrastructure and industrial environments.

According to the analysis, almost 20,000 Serial-to-Ethernet converters are available from the Internet, making it easier for an attacker to find and point to these teams. The detected failures are not trivial: they range from remote code execution to firmware handling and information filtering. In practice, this means that a malicious person could completely control the vulnerable device, alter the values that report sensors or change the logic of acting of connected devices per series, with potentially serious consequences in industrial plants, automation systems and connected medical equipment.

BRIDGE's technical casuistics: BREAK covers several attack vectors. There are failures that allow you to run code in your own converter (for example, several CVE related to remote execution), others that compromise the logic of the client or generate service denials, and vulnerabilities that overlook authentication mechanisms or enable the loading of arbitrary files and the handling of the configuration or firmware. There have also been reports of incidents qualified as device control, some with CVE identifiers and others with internal research references. All this makes a poorly secured converter a support point to move laterally within a network.

A plausible attack scenario described by the researchers begins with initial access to the network periphery - for example, through an exposed industrial router or a poorly defended gateway - and continues to exploit the failure of the serial-to-IP converter to intercept or alter the serial communications that travel between the field team and the IP network. The effect can be as subtle as distorting sensor readings or as destructive as changing orders to actuators; in both cases, the result is the loss of confidence on data and the control of critical processes.

Lantronix and Silex have published updates for their affected lines, so the first realistic step to reduce risk is to apply the official patches. Manufacturers can be consulted through their corporate and support pages - for example, in Lantronix and Silex- and to review the warnings and mitigation guides they publish. Forescout's research, which explains the scope and exploitation of BRIDGE: BREAK, offers context and technical recommendations; its material is available in the company's research section ( Forecout Research).

However, software correction is only part of the response. Additional operational measures are equally relevant: change default credentials, impose robust passwords, segment the network so that these devices do not have direct Internet access and limit the routes from the periphery to critical assets. It is also appropriate to audit the inventory of serial equipment, identify which converters are in service and assess whether their exposure to the network is really necessary. Entities dedicated to industrial cybersecurity and public bodies recommend this approach in their guidelines on the protection of control systems (see, for example, CISA security information ICS: CISA ICS and the NIST vulnerability database: NVD).

The emergence of BRIDGE: BREAK is a call for attention to an increasingly common risk: the convergence between inherited technology and IP networks without adequate security consideration. While serious-to-IP converters facilitate modernization and remote management, its deployment requires the same security guarantees as any other connected asset. Manufacturers, integrators and operators should treat these units as critical components, update them, configure them correctly and design the network to minimize the impact of a commitment.

If you manage infrastructure that depends on these converters, the most prudent thing is to review your suppliers' notices, apply the recommended updates and check the access settings. Public articles and newsletters that have covered the finding offer more technical details and mitigation steps; to expand information you can consult the news coverage and the original research, such as that published by specialized media ( The Hacker News) and the report of the researchers themselves in Forecout Research.

In short, BRIDGE: BREAK not only exposes specific failures in specific models of Lantronix and Silex, but also highlights a principle of operational safety: when you connect the physical world to IP networks, you introduce new vectors that need to be managed with priority. Ignoring that reality can open the door to very expensive and difficult manipulations to detect.