Sandbox exhaust poC in iOS 26 / 27 allows access to data from other apps, Binance alert

Apple iOS faces a process isolation vulnerability - popularly called "escape sandbox" - whose concept test was published in GitHub by a researcher who signs forcit. According to the code and the applications built on it, a program can, under certain conditions, access the data containers of other iPhone apps with iOS 26 and 27, potentially exposing pool seeds, private keys and stored credentials. Binance issued a public warning that recommends removing apps installed from unreliable sources and, if there was a suspicion of commitment, moving funds to a new portfolio created on a clean device.

Facts confirmed: the researcher published a project called word _ query in GitHub; third-party developers have used that code to create apps (for example, a file manager called WQ Files) that, according to their notes, can list and modify data from other applications without needing jailbreak or kernel exploits; Binance and other actors have alerted users; and recent iOS updates (including those referred to in 27.2.1 and 26.7.3) do not include public references to a patch for this problem in Apple's official security notes. In addition, sideloading tools such as AltStore and SideStore can facilitate the installation of apps that take advantage of the explosion because they generate the necessary containers and supplies when signing apps with an Apple ID.

How it works technically (in general terms and confirmed by publications): iOS isolates the data of each app in independent containers and regulates the exchange between apps through mechanisms such as App Groups and signed entries. The published code takes advantage of a flow that allows an app, by setting up an App Group container and using the permissions and provisions that are created when installing by sideloading, to access the contents of the containers of other apps of the system. The author claims that the PoC "can reach the data container of each app on an iPhone" and that in iOS 27 it can also touch some system directories. There is no need for a kernel or jailbreak explosion to execute these actions when the installation and supply conditions are met.

Which devices and users are at risk (confirmed and estimated): public sources of the project and of the apps based on it indicate iOS 26 and 27 as affected versions; however, there are discrepancies in the exact lists of supported versions between different developers, and some have added support for more recent versions after additional tests. It is confirmed that the threat materializes if the user installs an app that implements worse _ query - that is, apps sideloaded or manually signed -. There is no public confirmation that an app distributed through the App Store can exploit the technique, and that possibility remains uncertain: Apple's policies and signature checks make it difficult for a legitimate app in the App Store to obtain entitlments or provisions that allow for the arbitrary reading of other containers, but the absence of a public patch leaves open the possibility of undisclosed vectors.

Practical implications: If a malicious actor distributes an app that incorporates this escape and a user installs it (for example, by sideload), the app could read, modify or remove files from other applications present on the device. For users who handle cryptomoneda keys, bank applications or password managers, this implies direct risk of the exfiltration of secrets. Despite this, no confirmed theft or attacks linked to worse _ query have been reported to date according to the public statements of the developers and the exchange that the alert issued.

Limitations and what is not yet confirmed: There is no official Apple confirmation of vulnerability or that the latest updates will remedy it; the different repositories and applications using the PoC offer lists of versions with differences between them; there is no public evidence of mass abuse or nature theft. It cannot be said with certainty that an app distributed by the App Store cannot exploit the technique, although the Apple distribution and signature model makes that path less likely.

Differences in project compatibility reports indicate that the operation may depend on device-specific factors, the exact version of iOS and the way the app was installed or signed. Therefore, affirming a definitive list of affected versions would be premature until Apple publishes a technical analysis or a corrected patch.

What the user should do today (concrete and prioritized actions): first, immediately remove any app installed outside the App Store that is not strictly necessary or whose source cannot be verified. Second, update iOS and all applications to the latest available versions; although Apple's safety notes do not mention the correction of this escape, keeping the system updated reduces global exposure to known vectors. Third, if you have recently installed apps using sideload (AltStore, SideStore or others), review and disinstall those apps and consider revoking the certificates or supply profiles associated with your Apple ID. Fourth, for portfolio funds: if you suspect that there could be a leak, create a new portfolio on a device that has never had potentially compromised software installed and move funds there; use a cold wallet or a hardware wallet for high value assets. Fifth, enable additional security factors for important accounts (2FA with physical devices or security keys where possible) and change passwords from a trust device. Finally, register and document any suspicious activity (session changes, unrecognized transfers) and, if appropriate, contact the support of the services concerned.

For those who want to investigate more: the original publication and the derived apps are available in GitHub for public review; you can consult the repository with public search in GitHub to see the PoC and the discussions around the project ( search in GitHub: worse _ query). If you use sideloading tools, check the practices and risks on the page of that tool - for example, AltStore keeps documentation on how to sign and install apps on your website ( altstore.io). For the context of official security patches and notes, Apple brings its bulletins together in its support portal on security updates ( Apple - About security updates).

In short, there is a public concept test that demonstrates a method of breaking the isolation between applications in recent versions of iOS under specific installation conditions. The real risk for most users depends on whether they have installed apps from outside the App Store and the security practices that follow with their keys and portfolios. Until Apple confirms and publishes a patch, the most effective measure is to remove unreliable software, operate critical portfolios from clean devices or hardware wallets and follow the security recommendations of services using digital assets.